Abstract
Introduction
After nearly three decades of generous fiscal spending due to increasing hydrocarbon revenues and a monetary policy based on fixed exchange rates with procyclical effects, the Norwegian authorities decided to implement a more coherent macroeconomic policy design in 2001. This was meant to avoid economic overheating during oil booms, create greater monetary policy autonomy and to save oil rents for future generations, while at 1 Universidad Pontificia Comillas-ICADE, Madrid, Spain, ewirth@comillas.edu the same allow to maintain the welfare state by transferring certain part of the oil revenue into the government budget.
Our hypothesis states that the performance of the sovereign wealth fund, known as Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), and its coordination with fiscal and monetary policies led to a sustained and positive economic growth without major macroeconomic imbalances in Norway between 1990 and , particularly during the last sixteen years -when the link between the GPFG and the government budget was established through the fiscal rule in conjunction with an inflation targeting monetary policy. Our methodology consists in a case study with statistical analysis of the major macroeconomic aggregates.
The papers' main conclusions are the following: i) the Norwegian economy has gone through many external shocks between 2001 and 2017, but showed sustained and positive growth rates in conjunction with healthy macroeconomic indicators; ii) the GPFG achieved a spectacular growth by saving oil incomes and also through its investments' financial returns; iii) apart from its role as a savings fund for the intergenerational distribution of resource rent, the GPFG has also acted as a stabilization fund during times of economic weakness; iv) monetary and fiscal policies have been strongly countercyclical during periods of economic weakness between [2002] [2003] [2008] [2009] and since 2015; acted jointly in a countercyclical mode throughout the economic upturns of 2004-2007 and 2010-2011; but procyclically between 2012 and 2014 due to the fiscal rule's flaws.
After this short introduction, the second section enumerates the macroeconomic challenges faced by oil exporting economies owing to volatile and unpredictable petroleum prices and the exhaustibility of this resource. The third section introduces the main features of the Norwegian GPFG, including its history, governance, investment strategy and financial performance. Then the fourth section offers a short review of the macroeconomic framework in Norway throughout the 80s and especially the 90s, as it was a crucial decade for changes. The fifth and sixth sections introduce the current design of monetary and fiscal policy separately and the link between both is presented in the seventh section. The eighth section provides a detailed study of the performance of monetary and fiscal policies together with the GPFG's performance between 2001 and 41 2017 to see if both policies were effectively countercyclical. Finally, the ninth section concludes.
Sovereign Wealth Funds and macroeconomic challenges in oil exporting countries
The oldest and biggest Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) were born as stabilization funds in economies that were heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports (Balding, 2012 ). These countries face major hardships related to resource incomes: commodity prices are notoriously volatile, the value of oil reserves is hard to predict over the long-term and are finite. As a substantial part of fiscal revenues derive from oil activity, so is fiscal income and budget (Husain et al., 2008) . SWFs can serve as crucial tools for combatting macroeconomic volatility, stabilizing fiscal revenue in conjunction with nominal exchange rate appreciation, and preventing loss of competitiveness -the so-called Dutch disease (DD) 2 . These funds save oil revenue during booms and spend during downturns in order to smooth economic cycles.
Additionally, resource rent accumulation in SWFs targets the problem of resource exhaustibility as well. It is a means of transforming a finite resource wealth into a permanent wealth comprised of diversified financial assets, according to Hartwick's rule (1977) . Hence, the country can ensure that levels of public spending during the era of resource extraction can be sustained once the resource is exhausted, promoting intergenerational equity.
SWF require a mechanism of accumulation and withdrawal of money via fiscal rules.
Accumulation rules can be formulated in various ways: i) transfer a fixed percentage of resource revenues; ii) a deviation from past averages of resource income; iii) a threshold oil price; iv) based on non-oil fiscal balance; v) a combination of the former ones 3 . As for the withdrawal rules, there are several options depending on the country's features and needs. Collier et al. (2009) introduce three mechanisms. The first one is the permanentincome approach, which takes into account all the resource wealth, whether exploited or still under the ground, and states that yearly spending should be equal to S=r*W (where S is spending, r is the fraction that is spent each year, and W the total resource wealth), even when the extraction has not fully begun or has finished. However, W is difficult to estimate, so the second approach, the so-called "bird-in-hand" criteria (Bjerkholt and Nicolescu, 2004) , only considers the resource wealth that has already been extracted and its estimated future returns. Thus, all resource revenue is deposited in the SWF and only its annual real rate of return is spent. This is a rather conservative approach, suitable for developed economies with aging populations. However, for developing countries it could be preferable to opt for the third option, which allows increasing public spending in human and physical capital when the resource is discovered in order to increase the economy's non-resource productive base, which would generate economic growth even when the resource is depleted. Despite the establishment of many stabilization SWFs with their respective fiscal rules, there is still skepticism regarding their ability to moderate the growth of public spending and smooth cycles. The fundamental problem is that governments tend to interpret temporary shocks in commodity prices as permanent, which promotes excessive increases in fiscal spending during booms and halts investment and spending when busts occur (Alesina et al., 2008) .
Apart from coordination with fiscal policy, cohesion with monetary policy is also crucial in oil exporting countries. As we will see later on, most of the major oil exporting counties stick to tightly fixed exchange rates by pegging their currencies to the USD. There are several reasons for choosing the USD as a monetary anchor: i) it allows an emerging economy with weak institutions to import the monetary policy of a relatively stable country; ii) the USD peg provides a credible and easy anchor for inflationary expectations, simplifies trade and financial transactions; iii) oil and gas, their main exports, are traded in USD, so linking their currency to it eliminates the apparent mismatch between the government's USD priced oil revenues and its local currency spending; iv) in case of a resource boom, the peg prevents nominal currency appreciation which would harm non-oil sectors' competitiveness, thus it is a measure to fight DD. exporting countries need to lower local interest rates in order to maintain the exchange rate, which would exacerbate the expansionary business cycle (Looney, 2008) . Whereas, if oil prices fall and the USD stays strong, authorities cannot lower interest rates to boost their economies, but raise them because they need to keep the exchange rate, which aggravates the downturn. Moreover, the peg implies that oil exporter cannot defend against imported inflation from trading partners outside the US, such as Europe and Southeast Asia, and adjustments to the real exchange rate to a new equilibrium necessarily will happen via changes in domestic prices, a process that takes considerable time and leads to swings in real interest rates (Setser, 2007) . Therefore, in the absence of monetary autonomy, fiscal policy becomes the sole stabilizer for oil exporters with fixed exchange rates.
There are oil exporters with developed institutions that opted for a floating exchange rate backed by an inflation targeting monetary policy, such as Norway. However, the lack of independent central banks, developed financial markets and technical knowledge for inflation monitoring, makes Gulf countries inadequate for adopting this sort of regime.
The Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG)
The Government Pension Fund Global formally belongs to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance and is the world's largest SWF in terms of assets under management (figure 1).
Despite its name, the GPFG is not a public pension fund, but a stabilization and savings SWF to deal with the potential increase in pension expenses in a future context of resource depletion and aging population, so that a balanced public budget and intergenerational allocation of oil resources can be achieved. It lacks current pension liabilities and the link to the funding of future pension liabilities still has not been formally defined 6 , as 5 Applying the framework of the impossible trinity dilemma, a country can only choose two of the following economic goals: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration (Obstfeld et al, 2005) . 6 Until 2006 the Fund was known as Government Petroleum Fund, but it was rebaptized as GPFG. By incorporating the word "pension", authorities tried to make the Fund more acceptable for the citizens, as a tool for their future wellbeing (Ekman, 2006 The mainland GDP excludes offshore activities: oil and gas extraction and services related to it, pipeline transport of oil and gas, and maritime transport. However, the total GDP includes these activities. 8 Nestlé, Apple, Roche, Novartis, Amazon, Shell, Alphabet or Microsoft are the companies where the GPFG carried out most of its equity investments during the last years (NBIM, 2018 Source: author's calculations based on NBIM and SSB
The GPFG experiences changes in its market value each year due to three factors: the return on the Fund's investments, the transfer of oil revenues to the Fund carried out by the Ministry of Finance, and the NOK's exchange rate. According to figure 3, at the beginning of the Fund's existence the factor that contributed the most to the Fund's increase were the transfers made by the Ministry of Finance. However, as time went by and the value of the Fund increased, return on the investments acquired a major role, for the better or worse.
While transfers from the Ministry were positive 9 and very sensitives to oil prices, returns were volatile and could acquire positive or negative signs -in some years, as in 2008 and 2011, they detracted value. Nevertheless, ever since the Fund's establishment, the overall contribution of investment returns was positive and very similar in value to the contribution of transfers from the Ministry. The NOK's exchange rate also affects the market value, due to the fact that all of the Fund's investments are denominated in foreign currencies. As a matter of fact, the exchange rate is a shock-absorbing factor in relation to oil prices: when oil prices plummet and hence transfers of oil income from the Ministry 10 Return after subtracting inflation and management costs. (Mjøset and Cappelen, 2011) . Thus, fiscal policy was in charge of stabilizing economic cycles and fostering employment, a clearly Keynesian feature. As for monetary policy, its task was keeping the NOK's exchange rate as stable as possible against the currencies of the major European trading partners in order to maintain inflation rates close to the European average. Additionally, incomes policy pursued wage moderation and solidarity with a view to preventing high inflation, loss of competitiveness in international markets and unequal income distribution, which increased during the 80s (Mjøset, 1989) .
Between 1993 and 1996 economic growth was based on solid pillars, consisting in falling unemployment rates without financial and lower government imbalances. The Solidarity
Alternative was very successful until 1996, when government expenses began to increase at a higher pace in a context of economic bonanza. Wages were accelerating more than The effects of the Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises began to be noticed in 1998 through the oil price fall and the resulting instability in foreign exchange markets, which contributed to a procyclical monetary policy anew, as throughout the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s. Despite the oil price decrease, the GDP growth rate was above zero, the unemployment rate remained close to 3% and the inflation rate continued under control (figure 6). Real wages kept increasing above productivity in 1998 owing to a tight labor market (SSB, 1998) . In this economic framework the policy division set by the Solidarity Alternative no longer worked, both monetary policy and incomes policy operated in a procyclical way and fiscal policy was the only one in charge of stabilizing the economic cycle . Furthermore, intense growth rates registered in the GPFG's market value through 1999 and 2000 after the oil price recovery generated pressures in favor of higher fiscal expenses so that current generations could also benefit from oil windfalls.
Faced with such demands, the government in conjunction with Norges Bank decided to modify the way macroeconomic policy coordination was formulated in 2001, a policy shift that will be presented in detail throughout the following sections of this article. 
Monetary policy
From 1978 until 1990 the NOK was fixed to a basket made up of Norway's main trading partners' currencies, although authorities often resorted to surprise devaluations when employer and employee organizations set wage increases that surpassed productivity hikes and thus damaged the competitiveness of local exports in global markets. However, these devaluations no longer surprised economic agents during the 80s, they could not stop inflation and posed serious credibility issues for monetary policy (Gylfason, 1990) .
In 1985 In 1990 the NOK was pegged to the ECU via the European Monetary System (EMS), an anchor shared by Sweden and Finland as well. The Norwegian authorities believed that the adherence to the EMS would provide higher exchange rate stability and thus interest rates could be reduced (Kleivset, 2012) . Nonetheless, the decision backfired against
Norway and other countries when the Bundesbank raised interest rates in 1990 after the inflationary effects triggered out by the German reunification. It meant importing the monetary policy of an oil importer overheated by a costly reunification such as Germany 12 , while Norway was suffering from economic weakness. In order to keep the NOK's peg, Norges Bank needed to raise the key policy rate.
Norges Bank decided to let the NOK float freely in December 1992 as it was unable to counter the currency's value loss despite selling foreign currency and interest rate hikes above 10 percentage points (figures 7 and 8), which harmed local investment, consumption and the export sector's competitiveness. The NOK's value fell immediately after the free float was announced (figure 7). The floating exchange regime was meant to be a temporary measure until speculative attacks against the European currencies were over and economic growth was back, the Ministry of Finance's purpose was to return to a fixed exchange regime as before. Source: Norges Bank. Note: GBP stands for British pound, USD for US dollar, SEK for Swedish krone, EUR for euro, DEM for German mark and ECU for European Currency Unit.
13 Note that an increase of the exchange rate represents a depreciation of the NOK and a decrease an appreciation. increases ended up too high, the authorities could resort to currency devaluations in order the offset the loss of international competitiveness (Gylfason, 1990; Wallerstein and Golden, 2000; Steigum and Thøgersen, 2013) . 
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believing that price stability could be achieved by pegging the NOK to a basket made up by the currencies of European countries, such as Germany or France, whose central banks were pursuing inflation stability after having signed the Maastricht Treaty (Gjedrem, 1999; Skånland, 1999) . Thas is to say that monetary policy was imported again from countries with credible central banks. There was no longer a specific currency or currency basket that served as an anchor, nor fluctuation bands but by observing figure 8 it seems fair to state that the anchor continued to be the ECU with the same parity as at the foreign currencies between August and December 1998 to the detriment of its international reserves, but the NOK was getting weaker against the ECU, USD and GBP (figure 8). The depreciating trend was over in December 1998 as oil prices started to recover, but Norges Bank's policy officers acknowledged that the fixed exchange regime was not sustainable, particularly because the ECU was displaced by the euro in 1999. In January 1999 Norges Bank's new governor, Svein Gjedrem (1999) , announced that the only way to maintain a stable exchange rate in the long run was by reducing inflation rates to those of the Eurozone and Sweden, which were lower than the Norwegian ones between 1997 and 2000 (figure 6), and added that Norges Bank's persistent interventions in foreign exchange markets were no longer sustainable. (Svensson, 1997; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001 ).
The interannual inflation target was set at 2.5% with fluctuation bands of ±1 percentage points, which was 0.5 percentage points higher than the European Central Bank's or the Swedish Central Bank's target, and was due to the fact that Norway possess large oil exports which lead to potential leaks of oil money into the mainland economy, generating price and wage increases (Norges Bank, 2017) . Moreover, the target was almost identical to the average inflation of 2.4% recorded throughout the decade of the 90s 14 . However, the regulation states that temporary factors, such as changes in interest rates, taxes and external shocks should not be taken into account and two complementary price indexes besides the conventional CPI are used. The first one is the CPI-ATE, the CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products, which measures core inflation since it was first calculated in 2001. The second one is the CPIXE, the CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding temporary changes in energy prices and began to be calculated since 2007.
As for the policy's time horizon, the inflation target was first supposed to be achieved in 2 years, then the time horizon was widened to 1-3 years in 2004, but since 2007 Norges 14 The numerical target was lowered to 2% in February 2018, bringing it in line with other Western central banks (Norges Bank. 2018b ). The decision reflects Norway's evolution from an economy heavily reliant on oil to one that's trying to become less dependent on fossil fuels. But the change also coincides with a global struggle to revive inflation after years of record monetary policy stimulus.
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Bank only refers to "the aim of stabilizing inflation around the target in the medium term" (Norges Bank, 2018a).
Nevertheless, the reference to exchange rate stabilization still prevails and coordination with fiscal policy is also present. Norges Bank sets the key policy rate with a view to avoiding a strong appreciation and maintains the right to intervene in foreign exchange markets by buying and selling currencies if the NOK's value substantially diverts from the rate that would guarantee the inflation target.
The feature deemed to be relevant for our analysis is the monetary policy's flexibility, meaning that it is not only focused on controlling prices, but also on the exchange rate and the economic activity around its natural growth rate or on fostering employment.
Furthermore, inflation can fluctuate between an upper band of +1 percentage point (3.5%)
and a lower band of -1 percentage point (1.5%) around the desired numerical target, which allows for symmetrical deviations. Therefore, the Norwegian monetary policy is much more flexible than that of the European Central Bank (ECB), which states that "the ECB aims at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term", without mentioning fluctuation bands, nor economic growth, nor employment (ECB, 2018).
Fiscal policy
The State has a major role in the Norwegian economy: in 2017 general government income represented 54% of GDP, almost 10 percentage points above the European Union's (EU) average, and government expenses represented 51% in terms of GDP (OECD, 2018) . Out of all government income, 17% came directly from the oil sector, although this figure was above 30% during oil booms, a fact that portrays this sector's importance for the Norwegian state (figure 9).
Oil extraction began in 1971 and despite the slow increase in physical volumes throughout the 70s, the oil crisis abruptly increased the oil output's market value. At the beginning of the oil era both the government and social agents were worried about the potential effect that this new activity could entail for the rest of the economy, especially for fishing due to environmental reasons and for the non-oil export sectors by a loss of competitiveness through the DD. Report no 25 (1973-74) to the Norwegian Parliament asked for a moderate oil extraction, for a gradual inflow of oil rents so that they would not deindustrialize existing local industries, and for the use of oil rents to build a better society. It also mentioned the intergenerational distribution of oil rents but without referring to a savings fund. However, the international crisis led to excessive fiscal expenditures, as well as public and external indebtedness (Noreng, 1980) .
State oil revenues rocketed during the first years of the 80s due to high oil prices and the opening of several large oil fields (figure 9) and the economy entered in an expansionary phase. Nevertheless, the Conservative government of Kåre Willoch decided to apply tax cuts instead of using a countercyclical fiscal policy, and thus overheated the economy.
After the 1986 elections, the newly elected Labour government had to use a tight fiscal (as well as monetary and incomes) policy to stop the overheated economy, but the boom suddenly turned into a decline in 1988 and fiscal policy had to become expansionary, which lead to fiscal deficits during the beginning of the 90s (figure 10). During the 80s there were debates on how to isolate the mainland economy from oil rents.
In 1983 the Tempo Committee presented a report entitled "The Future of the Oil Activity", which advocated the separation of state oil income and fiscal expenditure by 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Net government cash flow from petroleum activities % of total government revenue (secondary axis)
applying a fiscal rule and investing the unused oil income in international markets through a savings fund. However, the Committee had limited confidence in the ability of the State to develop a savings fund and suggested that authorities put a threshold on the level of investments in the oil sector as previous production limits were useless.
After the unexpected oil price plunge in 1986 the Norwegian economy's exposure to the world oil market volatility became undeniable and in 1988 a new advisory group, named Steigum Committee, recommended the establishment of a financial fund nurtured by state oil rents to stabilize the economy and insisted anew on placing a maximum threshold on the oil sector's investment levels. integrally transferred to the Fund. However, at the end of the fiscal year, the government is allowed to transfer 4% of the Fund's value into the public ark in order to cover the structural non-oil fiscal deficit, while the rest remains in the Fund (figure 11). Therefore, 4% of the Fund's value can be transferred to the general government's budget each year with a flexible margin due to short term trends. It is based on the bird-in-hand approach, as only hydrocarbons already extracted matter when calculating the national oil wealth, the remaining resources below the ground are not taken into account. It is adequate for a 15 Norwegian Government (2001) . 16 This 4% is the expected long-term real net annual return on the Fund.
highly developed country, with strong public infrastructure, ample alternative sources of State revenue and an aging population. In March 2017 the Government decided to lower the fiscal rule's threshold to 3% of the Fund's value, as the actual real return on the GPFG's assets was below 4% between 1998 and 2016. This decision followed the advices given by the Central Bank's governor (Olsen, 2014) and the Fiscal Rule Commission, led by Øystein Thøgersen (Norwegian Government, 2015) in order to increase the Fund's sustainability. To sum up, the fiscal rule allowed to isolate state oil revenues from the general government budget, which could not be achieved neither with putting a cap on oil extraction volumes, nor with the establishment of maximum investment levels for oil companies. Thanks to this isolation, the oil extraction pace could increase without limits and the oil extraction topped between (Norskpetroleum, 2018 .
The link between monetary and fiscal policy
Now that we have introduced the design of monetary and fiscal policies in a separate way, this section aims at presenting the link between both, in order to stabilize the Norwegian economy countercyclically. While the link between the GPFG and fiscal policy is obvious through the fiscal rule that integrates the GPFG into the budgetary process, the tie between the GPFG and monetary policy is more indirect, and is defined by the link between fiscal and monetary policy.
The fiscal rule and the inflation targeting regime were announced simultaneously in damaging the non-oil sector's export potential. In order to avoid such unwanted appreciations, Norges Bank would continually have had to intervene in foreign exchange markets selling NOK and/or buying foreign currency and/or lowering the key policy rates.
As it was already mentioned, since 1994 and until 1999 the non-oil fiscal deficit did not stop decreasing both in absolute terms and in terms of the mainland GDP. Furthermore, all state oil rents were deposited in the GPFG, together with all dividends and interests generated by the Fund's investments, which probably avoided a stronger appreciation of the Norwegian currency. When the phase-in of state oil rents through the fiscal rule was laid down, the fixed exchange rate policy would have become unsustainable in the face of increasing non-oil fiscal deficits. The 4% fiscal rule entailed a fiscal expansion that would have led to substantial increases in aggregate demand, prices, costs and the real exchange rate (Torvik, 2004) . Such fiscal impulse would have triggered out inflationary pressures that could have been combatted with a tighter monetary policy, leading to a nominal appreciations, so that the peg's maintenance would have been extremely difficult. Thus, the easiest way to avoid importing monetary policies from structurally different European countries was letting the NOK float. This way, changes in terms of trade were absorbed by the nominal exchange rate, a swifter adjustment mechanism in comparison with real exchange rate adjustments, although it could also damage the nonoil sector's competitiveness during a prolonged period of high terms of trade.
According to White Paper no. 29's first page, the government's intention was keeping the Solidarity Alternative, in other words, the horizontal division of the roles of fiscal, monetary and income policies. But with the adoption of inflation targeting, monetary policy's procyclicality disappeared and Norges Bank acquired a prominent role in economic stabilization. This turn concerned social agents owing to the belief that a central banks with inflation targets merely act with a view to lowering inflation until reaching the target and cannot tolerate any increases in wages or domestic prices above the established target. That is to say, the relation between the three macroeconomic policies would no longer be horizontal but hierarchical, with the dominance of monetary policy (Mjøset and Cappelen, 2011) . Were the government to decide spending above the 4% rule to cover the non-oil deficit o were labor unions and the confederation of enterprises to set high wage increases, inflationary pressures would be created and Norges Bank would discipline the economy by raising interest rates, thus punishing the most indebted inhabitants. Therefore, governments that fail to comply with the fiscal rule and opt for high expenditure would be penalized with high interest rates. Citizens, especially younger generations accumulating debts with variable interest rates, would punish the ruling government in the next elections if it does not apply fiscal discipline.
Norwegian labor unions were particularly reluctant to the introduction of a strict inflation targeting policy because of the previous experiences in Denmark and Sweden. In these Scandinavian neighbors the move towards a strict monetary policy was accompanied by the weakening of collective bargaining, increasing unemployment rates, the erosion of social benefits and rising inequality among citizens (Moses, 1994; Iversen, 1996; Palazuelos and Buendía, 2014) . With increasingly interconnected capital markets, excessive wage hikes set during collective bargaining rounds ended up in international competitiveness loss and risks of capital flights towards countries with lower production costs. Thus, labor unions had lower leeway when demanding wage increases at the expense of profits and competitive devaluations -which were recurrent throughout the 60s and 70s, but were no longer feasible due to the distrust of foreign investors.
The first Labor government of Jens Stoltenberg, which ruled when White Paper no. 
Coordination between monetary and fiscal policy since 2001
Norway faced intense terms of trade shocks since 2000. Figure 12 reflects that the country's terms of trade showed an upward trend since the end of the 90s until 2014 and became much more volatile, especially if we compare them with those of the OECD, the EU and even the Nordic neighbors. This upward trend, although with many ups and downs is due to the fact that the Norwegian terms of trade are directly correlated with the oil price, thus following the same trajectory as the latter, increasing the Nowegian economy's exposure to external shocks, which could have led to higher volatility regarding economic cycles. However, it did not happen and Norway registered enviable macroeconomic data. activities. As for government debt in terms of GDP, Norway showed stable rates that were below those of the major OECD members or of the Scandinavian neighbors (figure 15). order to achieve such a stable economic framework in spite of the enormous terms of trade shocks faced by the country.
Monetary policy
Once inflation targeting and the subsequent floating exchange rate policy were adopted, the essential instrument of monetary policy became the key policy rate set by Norges Bank, apart from other complementary tools destined to combat lack of liquidity during financial crises. By observing figure 8, the downward trend of nominal interest rates stands out, and the rates were strikingly low during the past six years. This is due to external shocks, as immigration and the "China effect", which prevented inflationary pressures, as well as to key policy rates' downward trend in Norway's major trading partners: the Eurozone, Sweden and the United States. As for real interest rates, the trend Concerning the evolution of the NOK's exchange rate, it's volatility logically increased after the adoption of the free float against the euro, but also against the Swiss franc since 2008, while the rate against the Swedish krone remained almost constant (figure 7).
However, Norges Bank (2017) states that the currency's volatility is low in comparison with the exchange rates of other developed commodity exporters, such as New Zealand, Australia or Canada. Thus, Norges Bank still kept an eye on exchange rate stability and the instrument used for its management was interest rate differential regarding trading partners to the detriment of direct interventions in foreign exchange markets. During most of our period of analysis, Norges Bank followed a countercyclical and foreseeable policy concerning key policy rate setting, by taking into account not only inflation rates, but also economic cycles and the oil price. The sole exception took place in 2002: in spring there were fears of inflationary pressures and Norges Bank decided to raise the key policy rate. Nonetheless, the central bank's forecasts underestimated the economic weakness across the main trading partners after the dot-com bubble burst and the currency appreciation that a rising interest differential could trigger out (Bjørnland et al., 2004) . The NOK got stronger (figure 7), harmed exports and decreased aggregate demand and generated unemployment (figure 5). Norges Bank acknowledged its mistake and at the end of 2002 it began to progressively reduce the key policy rate until 2004.
These interest rate decreases soothed the economy, which started to recover and experienced a memorable expansion until 2007 (figure 4), sustained by the strength of global markets and rocketing oil prices.
It was in 2005 when it began to increase interest rates, but not due to inflationary pressures (price increases were well below the central bank's target, see figure 13 ), but because of fears of GDP overheating, which accelerated spectacularly owing to the oil price boom and the subsequent investment rush in the petroleum sector. Between July 2005 and June 2006, the interest rates set by Norges Bank and the ECB were practically identical ( figure   8 ) and remained below 4 percentage points despite strong mainland impulses, a tight labor market with unemployment rates below 3% (figure 6), and an upward trend in housing prices and the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo Børs). According to Goodfriend et al. (2007) and Revå (2010) , the maintenance of low nominal interest rates -close to or below 2% -during two consecutive years gave the impression that rates would remain low indefinitely, encouraging enterprises and households to take out debt and invest either in the stock exchange or in real estate.
In all likelihood Norges Bank took into account the trends in foreign exchange markets:
the NOK did not cease to appreciate against the USD and the pound sterling since 2002, although the parity remained relatively stable against the euro and the Swedish krone 13). Moreover, the monetary authority injected money into the banking system: it allowed to exchange less liquid bonds (covered bonds) for more liquid bonds (Treasury bonds), eased the requirements for its loans and provided direct liquidity denominated in foreign currency (Bergman et al., 2009 and Bjørnland et al., 2010) .
Owing to the oil price fall and interest rate cuts, the NOK suffered a considerable policy's main weakness is the fiscal rule's lack of flexibility. Admittedly it takes into account cyclical factors, as it is applied to the structural non-oil deficit, but neither does it consider oil price fluctuations, nor the weight of the non-oil deficit when compared to the total or mainland GDP. In other words, the fiscal rule is very sensitive to the increases in the GPFG's market value.
In February 2017 the government expressed its willingness to introduce changes to the fiscal rule and the percentage of the GPFG's market value that can be transferred annually towards the fiscal budget was lowered to 3%, which is the rule followed since 2013
( figure 19 ). Nevertheless the rule is still disassociated from the GDP or the mainland GDP, thus there is no limit for fiscal impulses that could avoid procyclicality. But linking the mainland GDP to the non-oil deficit would have its drawbacks: the forecast of the deficit is subjected to constant revisions along the fiscal year and the differences between forecasts made at the beginning of the year and at the end of the year can be equivalent to 1% or 2% of the mainland GDP.
Despite its flaws, the application of this bird-in-hand based fiscal rule generated remarkable government savings rates (figure 20). The government's savings rates increased since the beginning of the 90s and were equivalent to 10-25% of the mainland GDP between 2000 and 2015, with 16.3% average, while private savings rates also showed an upward trend but with a much lower average (10.4%). As both sector's savings rates display an upward trend, it can be concluded that government savings through the GPFG did not discourage private savings, that is to say, there was no Ricardian equivalence 18 . 18 The ricardian equivalence is a theory suggesting that a fiscal surplus or deficit has no effect on aggregate demand. It supposes that economic agents are foresighted and expect that if there are current fiscal deficits the government would have to pay off its debt by increasing taxes in the future. Therefore, households and enterprises would save more money in order to be able to pay higher taxes in the future. On the contrary, if the government decides to accumulate savings, economic agents would expect future tax cuts and would lift their present consumption and investment to the detriment of savings, but in Norway this did not happen. 
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Source: author's own calculations based on SSB
Conclusions
This article summarized the principal economic events in Norway since the 90s and the macroeconomic policies applied to stabilize business cycles, maintain low unemployment and inflation rates in a context of higher economic openness and the subsequent terms of trade shocks experienced by this oil exporter. Indeed, since 2000 Norwegian terms of trade became more volatile and showed an upward trend until 2014 when compared to the rest of developed countries, which is explained by high and unstable oil prices and high petroleum outputs. Subsequently, the Norwegian economy was prone to suffering from high economic instability since the end of the 90s. However, it did not happen, economic growth was positive and sustained by the mainland activities, unemployment rates were very low, inflation was under control, government accounts were healthy and showed high savings rates. Second, the persistence of low interest rate differentials prevented the NOK's brusque appreciation in foreign exchange markets, which relieved non-oil export sectors' loss of competitiveness in the midst of constant unit labor cost increases. Moreover, during oil price slumps the NOK's depreciation is warmly welcome as it restores the tradable sector's competitiveness and helps to reallocate productive resources that are expelled from the oil industry towards the non-oil sectors.
In third place, after five years of permanent accumulation of state oil rents in the GPFG, in 2001 authorities finally established a rule that allowed to separate state oil rents from budgetary expenses, something that had not been achieved by just limiting oil companies' rate of hydrocarbon extraction or their investments in the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
Apart from saving for a future characterized by the exhaustion of oil and gas reserves, the rule allowed for the channeling of a minimal part of the state oil rents into the economy, equivalent to the GPFG's long term rate of return in order to benefit current generations.
Governments Fourth, as the GPFG invests all of its money in assets located abroad, a sterilization effect is created in order to avoid the NOK's excessive appreciation and mainland economic overheating.
Fifth, the fiscal rule is not exempt from criticism, mainly for its great sensitiveness to the GPFG's rocketing value explained by high oil prices and return on its investments. Thus, despite meeting the fiscal rule, the non-oil deficit in terms of mainland GDP did not only increase during times of economic weakness as a result of a countercyclical fiscal policy, but also throughout the 2012-2014 expansion, which implies that there was fiscal procyclicality between these years.
Sixth, there is no doubt about the government's savings capacity via the GPFG, which represents a fiscal cushion equivalent to 280% of the mainland GDP, destined to face adverse macroeconomic contexts and the increase concerning retirement pension expenses in the future, when hydrocarbon resources start to get depleted.
Finally, we can conclude that, as a whole, monetary and fiscal policies were strongly countercyclical during times of economic weakness, as in 2002-2003, 2008-2009 and 2015-2016 because fiscal impulse was negative and Norges Bank slightly increased the key policy rate; and a procyclical combination as fiscal impulse was positive just when the GPFG experienced its major value gains and the central bank softly cut the policy rate.
